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TRUTH IN LENDING: CAVEAT VIATOR
NANCY E. TRIPP*
The Truth in Lending Act' was enacted in 1968 for the purpose of
enabling wise consumer selection from various credit options2 by com-
pelling creditors to make "meaningful disclosures" prior to the time a
consumer credit transaction is consummated.3 In the past decade, that
seemingly simple and clear statement of congressional intent has led to
a regulatory and case law morass that has puzzled both consumers and
creditors. Terms that should have been clear in order to put consumers
and creditors on notice of their rights and duties have eluded definition.
Litigants on both sides have demonstrated ingenuity in their attempts
to gain victories for their side while skirting the spirit of the Act. Con-
sequently, the courts have derided both sides for abusing the legisla-
tion.4
One recurring issue in litigation serves as a sample of some errors
in enforcement. It revolves around an inadequate definition of the
term "transaction"5 when applied to consumer credit sales.6 The facts
of the reappearing complaint are these: a consumer selects an automo-
bile to purchase, makes a downpayment (sometimes partial), and signs
a bill of sale after which financing is procurred for the balance. If the
seller helps to arrange the financing, and does so on a regular basis,
either accepting compensation for the service or having knowledge of
* Associate, Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle, Chicago, Illinois. Former Law Clerk to Hon-
orable Frank J. McGarr, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. B.A.,
North Park College; M.A., Northeastern Illinois University; J.D., Loyola University of Chicago
School of Law.
1. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Subch. I, Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1667e (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
2. Id. § 1601(a). See text accompanying notes 19-33 infra.
3. Id. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-226.2(kk), 226.8(a) (1979).
4. See, e.g., Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 889-90 (7th Cir.
1976) (Moore, J., dissenting); see generally Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S.
356 (1973).
5. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(kk), 226.8(a) (1979).
6. This article deals primarily with closed-end consumer credit sales which are governed by
15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1976) and with regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a), (b), and (c) (1979). Closed-
end consumer credit sales are distinguished from consumer loans governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1639
(1976), and from open-end credit plans, governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (1976). Open-end credit
plans are ones in "which credit terms are initially established with the opening of the account, but
no fixed amount of debt is incurred at that time," Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 532 F.2d 10, 17
n. I (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976), and include, inter alia, revolving charge accounts.
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(x) (1979).
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credit terms and participating in preparation of credit extension docu-
ments, 7 and is thus a "creditor" under the Act, 8 the question is raised
whether the disclosures required in section 1638(a) 9 and regulation Z' 0
must be made prior to the time the purchase contract is signed or
merely before the contract to finance is executed.
Section 1638(b) of the Act provides, with respect to consumer
credit sales, that: "the disclosures required under subsection (a) of this
section shall be made before the credit is extended. . . ."" At least one
court has interpreted the Act literally and held that so long as disclo-
sure was made prior to the consumer's commitment to the financing,
regardless of the prior unconditional commitment to purchase, the
creditor/seller has met with the requirements of the Act.'
2
Other courts have held that the disclosure requirement is triggered
by an irrevocable sales contract, made in contemplation of the seller's
assistance in securing financing.' 3 These latter decisions appear to be
predicated on an assumption, probably correct, that a commitment to
purchase will coerce the consumer's acceptance of credit offered; the
courts so holding construe the Act liberally in order to effectuate con-
gressional intent. '
4
These contrasting holdings evidence ambiguity in regulation Z,
equivocation in interpretative opinions issued by the Federal Reserve
Board' .5 and its staff, charged by Congress with carrying out the pur-
pose of the Act,' 6 and disagreement among courts as to the process of
construing the statute and applying it to the facts before them. Thus,
Congress' attempt to alter the doctrine of caveat emptor has ill-served
those parties intended to benefit from the Act.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT
The Act's legislative history is significant, for courts have fre-
quently resorted to legislative intent in order to determine the validity
7. These are elements of the definition of "creditor," which includes one who arranges
credit, as provided in the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1976) and in regulation Z. 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.2(h), (s) (1979).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o (1976).
9. Id. § 1638(a).
10. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b), (c) (1979).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
12. Alvarez v. Galassi AMC-Jeep, Inc., No. 78C 3802, slip. op. at 14-15 (N.D. Ill. July 9,
1979).
13. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Schmerler Ford, 397 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. I11. 1975).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976). See text accompanying notes 19-30 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 49-74 infra.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 222.1 (1979).
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of regulations implementing the Act' 7 or to make findings where there
is no clear direction from the Act or regulations interpreting the legisla-
tion. 18
The Act, pioneered by the late Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois,
promised aid to victims of "unscrupulous,"' 19 "predatory, '20 and, "at
times, fraudulent" 2' creditors.22 The most obvious prey was the con-
sumer, especially the relatively unsophisticated, and particularly those
of modest means23 who "remained remarkably ignorant of the nature
of their credit obligations and the cost of deferring payment, ' 24 who
were the least equipped to evaluate credit proposals,25 and who were
most likely to assume liabilities they could not meet.
26
Congress intended that, under the Act, the consumer would be
armed with clear, sufficient, and readily comparable information in or-
der to "shop" for the best credit deal available. 27 In addition, the legis-
lation promised protection to the "honest businessman from unethical
forms of competition" 28 and practices from which no one segment of
the industry felt it could depart or unilaterally reform. 29 Finally, Con-
gress noted that: "[elconomic stabilization would be enhanced and the
competition among the various financial institutions and other firms
engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by
the informed use of credit. ' 30 With those needs in mind, Congress pro-
17. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Schmerler Ford, 397 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. I11. 1975); Pastow v. Orien-
tal Build. Ass'n, 390 F. Supp. 1130, 1139 (D.D.C. 1975).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 18, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1962, 1975.
20. Id. at 20, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1977.
21. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973).
22. Testimony before congressional subcommittees evidenced that the credit industry had
grown at a rate four and one-half times that of the economy, with automobile purchase paper the
largest single element, and that the industry was continuing to expand at an extremely rapid rate.
Id.
23. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 18, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1962, 1975.
24. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 108, reprintedin [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1962, 1993.
26. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973).
27. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 106, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1962, 1990. The House Committee on Banking and Currency noted, inter alia, the
variety in computation and expression of "rate;" additional fees and charges, permitting a lower
"rate" but a higher yield to creditors; and the disclosure of cost but not rate, or vice versa. Id. at
13, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1970.
28. Id. at 18, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1975.
29. Id. at 15, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1970.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976). The late President Johnson heralded the legislation as one
which "would strengthen the efficiency of our credit markets, without restraining them." H.R.
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vided mechanisms for uniform and meaningful disclosure-rather than
for regulation of the industry3 '-and provided for civi 3 2 and criminal 33
penalties for violation of its proscriptions.
REGULATION Z
The Act is broadly structured and grants extensive rule-making
power to the Federal Reserve Board34 "to deal not only with the myr-
iad forms in which credit transactions [now occur] but also with those
. ..devised in the future. ' 35 Based on its judgment as informed by
experience in the field, 36 the Board may define conforming and prohib-
ited conduct with greater specificity than that outlined in the Act 37 in
order to effectuate Congress' purpose 38 and prevent circumvention of it
through apparent technical compliance. 39 Pursuant to that power, the
Board has published what is known as regulation Z,40 the validity of
which is tested by whether a rule is reasonably related to the purposes
REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 6-10, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1962, 1965. The committee noted that the Act "neither regulates the credit industry nor does it
impose ceilings on credit charges. It provides for full disclosure of credit charges, rather than
regulation of the terms and conditions under which credit may be extended." Id. at 6-10, reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1962-65.
A United States Department of Treasury official, testifying before a Senate subcommittee
considering the legislation, said that the "blind economic activity" of uninformed consumers seek-
ing credit was "inconsistent with the efficient functioning of a free economic system such as ours,
whose ability to provide desired material at the lowest cost is dependent on the asserted prefer-
ences and informed choices of consumers." Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S.
356, 363-64 (1973) (paraphrasing the remarks of Under Secretary Joseph Barr).
31. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976) provides in the case of an individual action that a creditor in
violation of the Act may be liable to a consumer for a sum of twice the amount of the finance
charge, but not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, together with costs of the action and reason-
able attorney's fees. Id. §§ 1640(a)(2)(A)(i), 1640(a)(3).
33. Id. Section 1611 provides for a fine of $5,000, imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both, for a willful and knowing violation.
34. Id. § 1604 provides:
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.
These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions,
and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions, as in
the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this
subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance
therewith.
Id.
35. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 365 (1973).
36. Id. at 372.
37. Id. at 371-73. See also McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1978) (refer-
ring to the Mourning decision).
38. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973).
39. Id. at 365.
40. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1, 226.1503 (1979).
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of the enabling legislation.4'
Section 226.2(t) of regulation Z42 defines a credit sale43 as "any
sale with respect to which consumer credit is extended or arranged by
the seller." Section 226.8(a) of regulation Z requires that disclosures be
made "before the transaction is consummated" and section 226.2(kk)44
provides that: "A transaction shall be considered consummated at the
time a contractual relationship is created between a creditor and a cus-
tomer . . . irrespective of the time of performance of either party. ' 45
In the fact situation referred to above, two contracts or "transac-
tions" exist, one for sale and the other for financing. With the execu-
tion of the first one, a purchase is made and the seller/arranger initiates
attempts to find financing for the purchaser. By execution of the sec-
ond, credit is in fact extended to the consumer.
The problem is determining which "transaction" triggers the dis-
closure requirement. Both fit the broad language of section 226.2(kk),
since both are contractual relationships between a creditor 46 and a cus-
tomer. One interpretive source is the Act itself, and the language of
section 1638(b) would indicate that the transaction which constitutes
the extension 4 7 of credit requires prior disclosure of its terms.48
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STAFF OPINIONS
A second source for interpretation is opinions of the Federal Re-
serve Board and its staff. Section 226.1(d) of regulation Z49 provides
41. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973). See Garner &
North Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Board of Governors, 464 F.2d 838, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
42. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(t) (1979) which follows the language of 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (1976).
43. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
44. Formerly 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(cc) and so designated in early cases and Board letters.
45. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(kk) (1979).
46. The fact situation implicitly includes two "creditors," for the terms as defined in the Act
and regulation Z encompasses both sellers who "arrange" credit and others, sometimes sellers,
who "extend" it. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
47. Regulation Z does not define "extension" of credit; because several sections distinguish
between "extend" and "arrange," it would appear that the Board considers them separate acts and
considers those who do them separate actors. See, e.g., notes 7 and 46 and accompanying text
supra.
48. In some variations of the fact situation, the first "transaction" may be found to be an
extension of credit as well as a sale because the circumstances indicate that the seller offered, and
the buyer accepted, the future extension of credit to be arranged, conditioned only on its availabil-
ity from a lender. The court in Coto v. Bert Weiman Ford, Inc., No. 77C 3348 (N.D. Ill. May 25,
1978), found an indication that some terms had been discussed, or at least noted by the seller on
the sale document. Id. at 2. Whether such a contract exists must be determined in accord with the
law of the state in which the transaction was made.
49. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d) (1979).
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for official50 and unofficial 5' interpretations in response to specific re-
quests for public comment, to be issued at the staff's discretion.
Creditors may avoid civil penalties by proving that they acted in
good faith conformity with an official Board or staff interpretation.
52
There is no such guarantee for the unofficial opinions. Some courts
have considered the unofficial letters, while not binding, are entitled to
great weight because they represent the "informed experience and
judgment of the agency to whom Congress delegated appropriate au-
thority. ' 53 Others, while perhaps calling them a "valuable tool" to in-
form the public of the law's requirements, 54 consider them "merely the
opinion of one staff member, 55 not even binding on the Board itself,
56
and to be disregarded where judicial interpretation may differ.
5 7
50. Id. § 226.1 (d)(2)-(4). Official staff interpretations are to be published in the Federal Reg-
ister to become effective thirty days after the publication date. Any official staff interpretations
issued after opportunity for public comment shall become effective upon publication in the Fed-
eral Register. Id.
51. Id.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(0 provides that:
No provision. . . shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith conformity with
any rule, regulation, or interpretation thereof by the Board or in conformity with any
interpretation or approval by an official or employee of the Federal Reserve System duly
authorized by the Board to issue such interpretations ....
One commentator urges that an administrative agency's interpretations must be considered
binding in opinions as to its own regulations. 1 R. CLONTZ, TRUTH IN LENDING MANUAL
§ 3.1 l(6)(a) (4th ed. Cum. Supp. 1979) [hereinafter referred to as CLONTZ], citing Bowles v. Semi-
nole & Sand Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945). In Bowles, the Court held that administrative
construction of regulations to be "of controlling weight unless.., plainly erroneous or inconsis-
tent with the regulation." Id. at 414. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the Court
noted that: "The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thorough-
ness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to con-
trol." Id. at 140.
53. See Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1974), and cases
cited therein. The Philbeck court remarked that: "We are not free to substitute our own discre-
tion for that of the administrative officers who have kept within the bounds of their administrative
powers." Id. at 977, quoting A.T. & T. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236 (1961). See also
Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1971), where the
court noted: "If the agency interpretation is merely one of several reasonable alternatives, it must
stand even though it may not appear as reasonable as some other." Id. at 977 n. 11. Accord,
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 378 (1973).
54. Pedro v. Pacific Plan, 393 F. Supp. 315, 323 (N.D. Calif. 1975). The court labeled them
"informal in nature." Id.
55. Franklin v. First Money, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 66, 71 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 599 F.2d 615
(5th Cir. 1979).
56. Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 747 (5th Cir. 1973). The court
noted that a Federal Reserve Board opinion printed in its Annual Report to Congress did "not
purport to be an official Board interpretation, was not promulgated pursuant to the Board's rule-
making or legislative function, and is not binding on the Board itself;" it was merely a suggestion
of the " 'more likely' meaning of the statute." Id.
57. See Stefanski v. Mainway Budget Plan, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 456
F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1972), and cases cited at notes 52-54 supra. One court commented:
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Only unofficial Federal Reserve Board letters58 on the issue
framed existed prior to the events that gave rise to the cases here dis-
cussed. The earliest ones interpret the word "transaction" and the tim-
ing of disclosures incident to it in relation to consumer loans59 and not
credit sales.60 The former invariably dealt with situations in which the
subject of the loan was a real estate transaction, and the letters make
clear that the extension of credit, and not a mere sale, triggers the dis-
closure requirement. 6'
Federal Reserve Board letters interpreting "transaction" incident
to closed-end credit sales rely upon and follow those for consumer
loans. Board letter 623, issued in 1972,62 concerns financing in connec-
tion with the sale of an automobile and recognizes that in some credit
sales there may be two "'consummations' one of the sale and one of
the financing. ' 63 Referring to letters on consumer loans, letter 623 pro-
vides:
[I]n some cases the sale and financing may be so interrelated that
they occur simultaneously. In those circumstances the disclosures
While such correspondence releases by the Federal Reserve Board are persuasive to this
Court, they are not binding authority as to questions of interpretations of federal law.
This Court does not agree with that interpretation because (1) it cannot determine
whether the agreement interpreted in that letter was identical, or even similar, to the
agreement executed and sued upon in this matter and (2) the letter does not provide any
information as to state law which may or may not affect the factual determination of the
status of the agreement.
Id. at 142.
58. The term "FRB letters" is employed by many courts when referring to the unofficial
opinions issued by the Federal Reserve Board staff. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Schmerler Ford, 397 F.
Supp. 323, 327 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
59. Consumer loans are governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1976). Section 1639(b) uses the same
language to indicate the timing of disclosures as used in section 1638(b) regarding credit sales.
The same sections of regulation Z apply to the timing of disclosures in consumer loans as in credit
sales. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
60. Closed-end consumer credit sales are governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1976).
61. CLONTZ supra note 52. Letters 92 and 93 provide that consummation occurs when a
creditor has agreed to extend and a customer has agreed to utilize the credit. While both apply to
a loan commitment to a lender, letter 92 adds that were a builder (seller) to agree, by the purchase
contract, to take a second mortgage, that agreement to extend credit would have been consum-
mated by the signing of the sales contract, requiring disclosures at its execution.
In addition, letter 778 makes clear that the rules enunciated in letters 92 and 93 assume that
the customer is under no obligation in the contract of sale to accept financing offered by the
builder. Moreover, the fact that the seller ultimately prepares the note and mortgage documents
for the credit transaction does not in itself constitute consummation of the credit transaction. See
id. Thus, where a consumer is free to turn down the credit offered in favor of a different offer or
full cash payment, no "transaction," as defined in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(kk) (1979) requiring disclo-
sure, has been consummated. A seller's preparation of credit documents-evidencing knowledge
of the credit terms-does not constitute a violation of the Act when the consumer is not bound to
accept the credit offered. CLONTZ supra note 52. Letters 1041 and 1241 reiterate that disclosure is
triggered by execution of the contract obligating the consumer to enter the loan transaction. Id.
62. Id. at app. E.
63. Id.
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would need to be made prior to the execution of the sale documents.
Staff believes that where the sale is conditioned on the seller arrang-
ing specific financing whose terms are known to the seller, so that the
financing is an integral part of the sale to the extent that a contractual
relationship has been created with regard to that financing, 'consum-
mation' of the credit transaction may have occurred at the time of
execution of the sale documents and disclosures should be made at
that point.64
It would appear that even with the cautionary words regarding transac-
tions by sellers who are active arrangers of credit and knowledgeable
about its terms, the act that requires disclosure is considered still a
financing transaction, not a mere sale. Thus, the opinion clearly coin-
cides with the only event designated in section 1638(b)-the extension
of credit.
Federal Reserve Board letter 84165 concerned a situation in which
a customer selected merchandise, made a refundable deposit, and ap-
plied for the extension of credit. 66 The letter referred the recipient to
letter 623 and concluded that "no contractual relationship is created
until the customer accepts and signs the security agreement," unless
under state law a contractual relationship is created when the deposit is
made.
The language of these two letters acknowledges circumstances as-
sociated with credit sales that less often accompany consumer loans
67-
active involvement of the seller/arranger with the extender of credit.
Letter 623 indicates conditions in which the extension of credit coin-
cides with the sale. The sale is conditioned only upon the seller's ar-
ranging credit for the buyer's purchase of the seller's merchandise and
that arrangement constitutes a condition precedent to the execution of
the contract, the occurrence of which cements the original contract as
one for financing and, thus, one requiring disclosure prior to its execu-
tion. By noting that this occurred "in some cases,"'68 the Board implied
that not all credit sales are transactions requiring disclosure.
Letter 841 stresses that the consumer must be free to walk away
from the financing. 69 Some authorities have suggested that the con-
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Clontz notes that: "The deposit is fully refundable, and there is no contractual obligation
to buy until the customer has been accepted and a security agreement stating the credit terms is
signed by the customer." Id.
67. But see letter 778 supra note 61.
68. See text accompanying notes 63 and 64 supra.
69. Clontz has interpreted this letter as stating that "[clonsummation occurs when customer
becomes bound to purchase .. " CLONTZ, supra note 52, at 1239. While that is indeed where
the Board was heading, that is not the subject of letter 841.
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sumer has to be free to decline to purchase, but others have concluded
that while a consumer might be free to substitute cheaper financing (or
draw upon savings if no financing available was a deal the consumer
considered wise), a consumer's commitment to a purchase might obli-
gate a seller, if it also aided in arranging financing, to disclose the re-
quired terms prior to execution of the sale documents. Indeed, some
courts relied upon the letters to reach such a holding.
70
In an official Federal Reserve Board staff opinion letter issued sub-
sequent to the events forming the basis for the cases discussed below,
7'
the Board's position was made unequivocal for the first time. Where a
customer selects a car and requests financing, but the terms of the in-
stallment credit contract and the identity of the finance company are
uncertain, the seller may defer "consummation" of the transaction, as
that term is defined by section 226.2(kk) of regulation Z, and the re-
quired disclosures may be made when financing is accepted by the cus-
tomer.72 The sales contract must clearly provide that the order is not
binding on the buyer and buyer may cancel it and recover the deposit.
No contractual obligation to purchase may exist until the disclosures
are made and the customer accepts financing. Where the seller wishes
to provide a customer with a car immediately, before financing can be
arranged and the appropriate disclosures made, it may be done only so
long as the consumer is not obligated to purchase the vehicle.
The staff opinion intimates that this is a position of long-standing
with the Board, referring parenthetically to Board letters 623 and 841.
In other words, the author implies that letters 623 and 841 should have
made clear that "transaction" refers to any closed-end "credit sale" and
not merely to an agreement to extend credit.
It can be argued, however, that letter 623, by indicating that the
sale and financing occur simultaneously "in some cases," points to
quite the opposite. Perhaps all that can be concluded is that letters 623
and 841 should not have been depended upon, not only because they
were unofficial7 3 but also because they were unclear. 74 As a result of
70. See notes 76-84, 108 and accompanying text infra.
71. Official Staff Interpretation No. FC-0130, reprinted in CLONTZ, supra note 52, at supp. 2.
The letter is dated November 2, 1977. By operation of 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(2)(ii) (1979), it would
have become effective no earlier than December 2, 1977, several weeks following the events giving
rise to Alvarez v. Galassi AMC-Jeep, Inc., No. 79C 3802 (N.D. I11. July 9, 1979), the most recent
case in this area.
72. Official Staff Interpretation No. FC-0130, reprinted in CLONTZ, supra note 52, at supp. 2.
73. See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
74. For an extensive recounting of unclear and inconsistent staff opinions, see St. Germain v.
Bank of Hawaii, 413 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1976), rev'd, 573 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1977). The
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the official interpretation, the word "transaction" now means "credit
sale" when applied to section 1638 and "loan" for section 1639. In the
process, the phrase "extension of credit" has become meaningless to the
construction of section 1638.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
As with the Federal Reserve Board letters on loans, cases constru-
ing the timing of disclosures in connection with consumer loans under
section 1639(b) appear to agree that a binding contract for the exten-
sion of credit, and not merely a purchase contract, trigger the Act's
disclosure requirements.75 In contrast, the majority of cases construing
timing under section 1638(b) have held that the sales contract triggers
the disclosure requirement where the contract is binding on the con-
sumer, where both parties contemplate that the purchase will be
financed, and the seller arranges credit that the buyer subsequently
uses.76 Some decisions do so by finding the sales contract to be an
agreement for the extension of credit as well as for purchase.77 Others
focus merely on the fact that both parties contemplated a "credit
sale."
78
Indicative of those opinions is Gonzalez v. Schmerler Ford,
79
wherein the court found that the parties intended a credit sale, not a
cash purchase, 80 and that a credit sale necessitated disclosure on the
day the buyer signed the purchase document.8' The court was also
pursuaded in its findings by the seller's close relationship with the ex-
tender of credit8 2 and the seller's credit manager's experience. 83 The
Gonzalez court quoted extensively from Board letter 62384 and re-
garded the sale and financing as so interrelated that they occurred si-
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Board's issuance of "con-
flicting signals," and resolved the issue (one in conflict among the circuits) according to what
made "more sense to us in trying to achieve the congressional purpose." Id. at 575-77.
75. See, e.g., Waters v. Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Co., 582 F.2d 503, 505 (9th Cir. 1978); Bis-
sette v. Colonial Mortgage Corp., 477 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d
1062, 1065 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
76. See notes 80-84, 89-94, 98-107 and accompanying text infra.
77. Hardin v. Cliff Pettit Motors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 297, 299 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
78. Gonzalez v. Schmerler Ford, 397 F. Supp. 323, 328 (N.D. 111. 1975).
79. 397 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. IUl. 1975).
80. Id. at 324-26.
81. Id. at 324.
82. Id. at 328. The extender of credit was Ford Motor Credit Corporation.
83. Id. at 328. The court noted that the defendant must have been able to predict which
customers would receive credit as well as the terms.
84. See generally notes 62-74 and accompanying text supra.
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multaneously.8 5 Further, the court noted that the purpose of requiring
disclosure-to enable informed credit "shopping" by consumers in a
competitive market 86-would be undermined by permitting sellers to
bind their customers to purchase goods for which the true cost of acqui-
sition is only known at a later date when the consumer "has a choice of
either signing the creditor's conditional sales contract form or of having
collection procedures instituted against him because he is unable to
come up with the cash."
'87
The decision in Gonzalez appears to be based on an equation of
the Act's term "credit sale" 88 and the regulation's term "transaction.
89
The opinion does not make this position totally clear. Thus, without
finding the first contract one that legally bound the buyer to accept
credit arranged by the seller, the court appears convinced that the
buyer's perception that he must make good his commitment to
purchase by accepting the credit, or be subject to suit for the cash price,
constitutes circumstances requiring disclosure in order to effectuate the
Act's purpose and to prevent a seller from circumventing Congress' in-
tent through mere technical compliance. 90
In Hardin v. Cliff Petit Motors, Inc.,91 the court reached the same
result by a different process. On the first date, the buyer signed a par-
tially completed bill of sale, noting a partial downpayment, and took
possession of the car, much as in Gonzalez. The court concluded that,
since neither party contemplated a cash sale, those actions constituted
an agreement to extend credit, the terms of which were to be provided
by the seller,92 and the validity of which was not dependent on the
85. 397 F. Supp. at 327.
86. See notes 19-30 and accompanying text supra.
87. 397 F. Supp. at 327, quoting R. JOHNSON, R. JORDAN & W. WARREN, ATTORNEY'S
GUIDE TO TRUTH IN LENDING III (1969). The court noted that Professor Johnson was a consult-
ant on the Truth in Lending Regulations for the Federal Reserve Board, and further quotes John-
son: "The purpose of the purchase order procedure is only to allow a salesman to get a floor
commitment from the buyer that can be used to counteract the buyer's remorse while he awaits
clearance at the credit office." Id.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (1976).
89. E.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1979).
90. See Partida v. Warren Buick, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1366, 1369 (N.D. I11. 1978), where the
court refers to Gonzalez v. Schmerler Ford, 397 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1975), and states:
The [Gonzalez] court found that [at the signing of the purchase document] both parties
contemplated a credit sale and therefore a consumer credit transaction was consum-
mated within the meaning of the Act. . . .The basis of the court's holding was that the
seller should not be allowed to bind the buyer to what is in fact a credit sale by the
execution of what purports to be merely a sales contract without disclosing to the buyer
what the credit terms will be when the installment contract is ultimately signed.
454 F. Supp. at 1369.
91. 407 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
92. Full disclosure was made at the signing of the note. Id. at 298.
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fulfillment of conditions precedent to performance, such as purchaser's
completion of the downpayment and execution of the note.93 Since dis-
closure must have been made to a purchaser before he became commit-
ted to any particular lender,94 the court concluded that disclosure must
have preceded execution of the first agreement.
95
It is possible to decide instead that a purchaser is free to turn down
the credit offered and suffer the consequences 96 of having prematurely
agreed to buy goods for which the person does not have available
money. One could assert that while Congress intended to protect con-
sumers from the many disguises of credit reporting, 97 it did not intend
to protect consumers from reneging on agreements to purchase. A fur-
ther assertion could be made that the purchaser could shop for other
available credit in the time between the commitment to purchase and
the commitment to take the credit arranged by the seller unless the
prior agreement constituted a clear commitment to take the credit ar-
ranged by the seller.
That is the effect of the decision in Alvarez v. Galassi-AMC Jeep,
Inc.98 There, the court noted that section 1638(b)99 of the Act merely
requires disclosure before the credit is extended and that sections
93. Id. at 299-300, referring to RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 250(a) (1932).
94. 407 F. Supp. at 299, quoting Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 874 (1973).
95. 407 F. Supp. at 299.
96. Many of the purchase orders or bills of sale forming the bases of the actions discussed
provide that any money paid may be kept by the seller as liquidated damages to cover expenses or
losses incurred as a result of the purchaser's failure to complete the purchase. See, e.g., Alvarez v.
Galassi-AMC Jeep, Inc., No. 78C 3802 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1979); Gonzalez v. Schmerler Ford, 397
F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
97. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
98. No. 78C 3802 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1979). See also Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 361
F. Supp. 1255 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974). In Philbeck,
the court did not face the issue squarely since it found that the installment sales contract extending
credit contained deficient disclosure. But since the buyer had contended that the purchase order
constituted the contract to which Truth-in-Lending disclosures applied, the court dismissed it in a
footnote. The court noted that because the order was conditional on obtaining financing and
those arrangements were not complete, the document "made no pretense of complying with the
Act." 361 F. Supp. at 1257 n. L. When the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed on other grounds, it was silent on this point. The appellate court opinion noted that the
Federal Reserve Board staff was aware of the trial court opinion and had commented negatively
on its treatment of optional credit life insurance. See 499 F.2d at 980 n. 18. But the staff was silent
on sale document holding. While this silence can be construed as approval of the district court's
analysis, neither the district court nor the appellate court disturbed the only reported decision
agreeing with the conclusions of the court in Alvarez. See also Baxter v. Sparks Oldsmobile, Inc.,
579 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), in which the court held that the sale document did not
require prior disclosures. The Baxter court, however, did not properly have the issue before it
because the buyer had successfully repudiated the sale and credit was never extended. Id. at 864.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b) (1976).
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226.8(a) and 226.2(kk) 00 cannot be construed without reference to the
Act. The court was of the opinion that cases in the mold of Gonzalez
and Hardin went beyond the dictates of the Act and the regulations. 10
Each court's interpretation of the meaning and effect of the Act
and regulations rests on, or colors, each court's preliminary finding re-
garding the nature of the first contract. In Alvarez, the court found the
contract only an obligation to purchase, 02 although the document re-
vealed that both parties contemplated a credit sale. The Alvarez court
did not find that it bound the buyer to use the credit that the seller
could arrange. 0 3 The court in Coto v. Bert Weinman Ford, Inc.0 4
found that the inclusion of credit terms in (or notations on) the
purchase order signaled a contract to extend credit at a later date. 0 5
Gonzalez and Hardin emphasized that the documents evidenced that
both parties contemplated a credit sale and that the buyer's possession
of the car immediately upon signing the agreement to purchase on
credit was further indication of a contract to extent credit. 0 6 Gonzalez
and Coto concluded, in the language of and with reference to Board
letter 623,107 that the purchase and signing of the loan were too interre-
lated to be considered two distinct transactions.
Thus, the majority of most courts facing the issue, in effect, have
construed the word "transaction" of section 226.2(kk) of regulation Z
to mean "sale" when it is applied to consumer credit sales under section
1638(b) of the Act. Most courts do so in order to effectuate the purpose
of the Act.' 0 8 But courts applying the regulation section to consumer
loans under section 1639(b) find "transaction" to apply to the extension
100. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.8(a), 226.2(kk) (1979).
101. Alvarez v. Galassi-AMC Jeep, Inc., No. 78C 3802, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1979).
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id. at 14. The purchase order showed a total "cash delivered" or purchase price of
$2,100, a deposit of $10 submitted with the order, $250 cash to be paid at time of delivery, and
$1,840 "balance to be financed." Id. at 2. The court found that the indication on the purchase
order that the balance would be financed and that no credit was extended to the purchaser for the
purchase of the motor vehicle except as appeared in writing on the face of the agreement and did
not constitute a contract between plaintiff and defendant for the latter to extend credit or for the
former to be bound to financing arranged. Id. at 7, 14.
104. No. 77C 3348 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 1978).
105. Id. at 12.
106. Hardin v. Cliff Petit Motors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 297, 299 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Gonzalez v.
Schmerler Ford, 397 F. Supp. 323, 328 (N.D. Il. 1975).
107. See notes 62-74 and accompanying text supra.
108. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit appears willing to overlook
specific provisions of the Act in order to effectuate broad legislative intent. In Goldman v. First
Nat'l Bank, 532 F.2d 10, 20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976), the court held that, in
determining a limitations issue, the intent of the Act was effected only if the limitations period
was measured from the time of a meaningful event other than that specified by the Act. 532 F.2d
at 21. But see the dissenting opinion of then Judge Stevens, noting that while it might have been
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of credit. i09 The word is ambiguous in the regulation and in the unoffi-
cial staff opinion letters, and the decisions and official staff opinion con-
strue it only by implication.
RAMIFICATIONS
Many consumers' attorneys consider the technical construction in
opinions like Alvarez as providing unfair barriers to enforcement of
legislative intent behind which those wishing to avoid the paperwork of
regulation Z or to deceive a consumer safely may hide from liability.
These attorneys join with the apparent rationale of the majority of
courts which have considered the problem: The buyer, caught between
the Scylla of expensive credit and the Charybdis of an otherwise unaf-
fordable financial obligation and the potential for suit, by the prior exe-
cution of a binding contract to purchase goods, was committed also to
purchase credit terms without knowledge of their cost. Unsophisticated
buyers, for whom the legislation was enacted, "l0 especially may not un-
derstand their right to "shop" and substitute more reasonable terms.
That the obligation should be considered a transaction to which a
consumer's rights under the Act attach is probably an appropriate judi-
cial gloss. Congress "intended to enact remedies that reflected con-
sumer realities.""' It empowered the Board to promulgate regulations
to accomplish those ends"12 and such a regulation would seem appro-
priate and within the authority of that agency.' '3 Had the Board or a
court 14 stated the proposition that clearly, this discussion would be un-
necessary.
Because the Board and courts have not done so, one must inquire
wise for Congress to enact a different provision, it did not do so and the plaintiff may not avail
himself of the remedy created by this statute. Id. at 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.
11. Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257, 265 n. 16 (3d Cir. 1975). See
also Hickman v. Cliff Peck Chevrolet, Inc., 566 F.2d 44, 46 (8th Cir. 1977) (the substance rather
than the form of credit transactions should be examined); Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc.,
384 F. Supp. 722, 728 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 539 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1975) (focus on substance of transaction, not form).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
113. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 365-66, 369-72, 377 (1973).
114. Gonzalez v. Schmerler Ford, 397 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. 111. 1975), approached that position
in dicta. See notes 86-87 and accompanying text supra. But the decision is premised on what this
writer would suggest was a premature equation of "credit sale" and "transaction" bolstered by the
close association of the lender and seller.
A comparison of the language of Board letter 623 and Official Staff Interpretation No. FC-
0130 demonstrates that the Board staff did not so define "transaction" prior to the publication of
the latter document. See CLONTZ supra note 52. See also notes 68 and 71-74 and accompanying
text supra.
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whether the Act and regulations fairly put a creditor on notice of the
consequences of the acts described in the instant problem. While the
Act is remedial and not penal " 5 and thus may be broadly construed in
light of its purpose,' 1 6 the prohibited conduct should be clearly set
out" 1 7 for both lender and borrower.
1 8
In pursuit of protection for the consumer, one can reflect on
whether it is fair for the seller/creditor to join justice behind the blind-
fold. It was because Congress found the consumer unable to clearly
view the cost of credit that the Act became law. Should the consumer
appear to have been given more than a fair deal, and the creditor now
be seen as acting in the blind, a move to balance the scale could undo
the consumer's gain.
A source of difficulty with the enforcement of the Act lies with
Congress' scheme to eliminate the need for the consumer to prove fault
in order to establish violation of the Act and the judicial move to rein-
sert it where subversion of the Act is perceived. In order that suits
under the Act be more readily maintainable, Congress made it unnec-
essary for consumers to prove deception, fraud, or other malevolent
intent by the creditor. Similarly, proof that the consumer was in fact
either deceived or harmed was not included as an element of the ac-
tion. 19 Prosecution 20 requires only proof that a creditor failed to
make disclosures in the form prescribed and at a time prior to the con-
sumer's commitment to borrow, with the burden of compliance resting
upon the creditor.' 2' Thus, fault and motive were replaced by regula-
tions against which one would measure actions.
One of the consequences flowing from the scheme is that suits
have been brought for what courts have characterized as mere "techni-
cal" violations of the Act, where none of the harm Congress sought to
115. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 375 (1973).
116. Id. at 376. See generaly McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 848-49 (5th Cir. 1978);
Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 1975); Littlefield v. Walt
Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir. 1974); Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furn. Co., 479
F.2d 740, 748 (5th Cir. 1973); Gardner & North Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Board of Governors,
464 F.2d 838, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sanders v. Auto Assocs., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 900, 902 (D.S.C.
1978); Starks v. Orleans Motors, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. La. 1974); Ratner v. Chemical
Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
117. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 376 (1973).
118. Hickman v. Cliff Peck Chevrolet, Inc., 566 F.2d 44, 48 (8th Cir. 1977).
119. E.g., Charles v. Krauss Co., Ltd., 572 F.2d 544, 546 (5th Cir. 1978); McGowan v. King,
Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 848-49 (5th Cir. 1978).
120. Courts have referred to the Act as having created a system of private attorneys general to
aid in enforcement. See McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1978).
121. Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 877 n.8 (7th Cir. 1976);
Sneed v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 410 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (D. Hawaii 1976).
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avoid was present.' 22 On the other hand, courts have resorted to the
subjective test of legislative intent where they considered either a con-
sumer harmed by actions not specifically prohibited or a creditor at-
tempting evasion of the law's intent through mere technical
compliance. 23 Thus, creditors have been caught both ways.
What is perhaps most interesting is that courts purporting to con-
strue the Act and regulations in light of congressional intent have been
less than thorough. For example, the Act's goal of encouraging credit
shopping is undermined by construction that finds compliance with the
requirement for the timing of disclosures satisfied by mere delivery of
the terms immediately prior to a consumer's commitment to a loan. 124
Although such practices do inform the consumer of the total cost of
purchase, they do not encourage comparison of the figures with other
available credit and thus defeat the goal of a competitive economy pro-
viding desired service at the lowest cost. 125 Some have begun to ques-
tion whether regulations that remove considerable responsibility from
buyers serve the purpose of educating consumers either of the wisdom
of a particular transaction or of the general nature of their marketplace.
CONCLUSION
It is not argued here that the Board's now official position or the
opinions of courts that predated it are ill-founded or unfair. The effect
is to eliminate some coercion, and sellers are not greatly disadvantaged
since the Act allows for estimated disclosure should finality of the
purchase, rather than a mutually conditional sale, be desirable by ei-
ther party. 126 Further, the Act provides that creditors may adjust ac-
counts within fifteen days of discovery of an error and prior to
institution of an action or receipt of written notice of error. 127 The leg-
islative history of the Act reflects Congress' intent to protect from devi-
ous creditors not only consumers but also honest businesses put at a
122. See, e.g., Stefanski v. Mainway Budget Plan, Inc., 456 F.2d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1972) (ques-
tioning appropriateness of imposition of penalty in such a case); Bird v. Goddards Discount Furn.,
443 F. Supp. 422, 424 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (indication that penalty unfair but required by Act).
For criticism of use of the Act for "harassment, oppression, or unjust enrichment," see
Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 889-90 (7th Cir. 1976) (Moore, J.,
dissenting); Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 230, 237 (10th Cir. 1975).
123. See Gonzalez v. Schmerler Ford, 397 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
124. Waters v. Weyerhauser Mortgage Co., 582 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1978).
125. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
126. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(f) (1979).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b) (1976). However, such error must be borne by the creditor and ad-
justment must be made in favor of the consumer. Villanueva v. Motor Town, Inc., No. 79-1271
(7th Cir. Apr. 7, 1980).
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competitive disadvantage by those who would successfully use a crev-
ice in the regulatory scheme while running roughshod over its intended
goal.

